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Brexit, the UK and Scotland: the story so far: 
A constitutional drama in four acts. 
  
  
 
The European Union (EU) referendum result has led to the unfolding of a domestic 
constitutional drama in the United Kingdom, which on its current trajectory could lead to its  
break-up. Written just prior to the anticipated trigger of the Article 50 TEU process to leave  
the European Union, this chapter maps that trajectory by considering the roles of the key 
institutional actors in the drama so far. 
 
Setting the scene 
 
:LWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKHFXUUHQWGHYROXWLRQVHWWOHPHQWWKH8.¶VZLWKGUDZDOIURPWKH(8
µ%UH[LW¶will mean that Scotland also leaves, despite 62% of the Scottish electorate voting to 
µUHPDLQ¶,QOHJDOWHUPVWKH8.DVDVWDWHUHFRJQLVHGunder international law is the signatory 
to the European Treaties. Withdrawal of that state includes its constituent parts. However 
ZKLOHUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(8ZHUHGHVLJQHGLQWRWKHGHYROXWLRQVHWWOHPHQWDVµUHVHUYHG¶WR
Westminster, the devolved administrations are required to honour the obligations of EU law; 
hence the Scotland Act provides that an act of the Scottish Parliament is not law if it 
contravened an EU obligation; the Scottish Parliament and Scottish ministers have powers to 
implement EU obligations of the UK in devolved matters (Scotland Act 1998 s.53 and s.57) and 
WKHGHYROYHGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVKDYHEHHQLQYROYHGLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH8.¶V(8SROLF\
via the Joint Ministerial Committee (an intergovernmental talking shop set up within the 
Devolution settlement and which means in various subject matter formats).  In short, EU law 
LVHPEHGGHGZLWKLQ6FRWODQG¶VGHYROYHGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODQGVFDSHDQGD8.ZLWKGUDZDOIURP
the EU will have direct and significant impacts on the devolution settlement as currently 
designed ± something that was not apparently planned for.  
This sets the scene for a constitutional drama which has been slowly unfolding since 24 June 
2016.  
 
Act 1 
 
Enter ± the Scottish Government 
 
The referendum result has prompted calls IURP6FRWODQG¶V)LUVW0LQLVWHUWRµWDNHDOOSRVVLEOH
VWHSVDQGH[SORUHDOORSWLRQVWRJLYHHIIHFWWRKRZSHRSOHLQ6FRWODQGYRWHG¶7he Scottish 
Government is keen to retain a strong relationship with the EU based on five key tests set out 
by the First Minister in a speech in July which will serve as a benchmark to assess the extent 
WRZKLFKDQ\%UH[LWVROXWLRQVSUHVHUYHNH\LQWHUHVWVYLHZHGWREHUHODWHGWR6FRWODQG¶V
relationship with the EU: democracy; economic prosperity; social protection; solidarity; and 
influence. Short of a second independence referendum which, if successful, would allow 
Scotland to become an EU Member State in its own right, consideration, as promised, has 
been given to whether Scotland could remain in the EU without seeking independence.  The 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQKDVEHHQODLGRXWLQWZRSDSHUV7KHILUVWScotland a 
European Nation, sets RXWWKHUDWLRQDOHIRU6FRWODQG¶s approach to membership of the EU in 
terms of its political, historical and cultural orientations. It sets out an argument for due 
process in the Brexit negotiations and the other EU Member States appear to be its intended 
audience. In essence, it argues that Scotland has a special relationship in Europe and has a 
right to be heard. The second paper, ScotlanG¶V3ODFHLQ(XURSH, was published on 20 
December 2016 and was intended for a UK audience. At the outset, the paper reiterates the 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VZLVKIRUWKHZKROHRIWKH8.WRUHPDLQDQ(80HPEHU6WDWH
although it recognises that the referendum result does not permit such an outcome. In order to 
PLWLJDWHWKHLPSDFWRI%UH[LWRQ6FRWODQGWKHSDSHUWKHUHIRUHDGYRFDWHVIRUWKH8.¶V
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement and the Customs Union. In 
the event that such an option is not feasible, the paper takes a two-track and differentiated 
approach to mitigating the impact of Brexit.  First, it argues in favour of Scotland remaining 
within the European Single Market through membership of the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA). However, if that also proves not to be possible and Scotland finds it is no longer a 
member of the European Single Market, then the policy proposals argue in favour of 
devolution of the necessary powers to allow the Scottish Parliament to legislate on areas 
which are RISULPDU\FRQFHUQ7KLVLQFOXGHV³UHSDWULDWHG´SRZHUVLHWKRVHSUHYLRXVO\ZLWKLQ
WKH(8¶VFRPSHWHQFHZKLFKDUHQRWFXUUHQWO\ZLWKLQDUHDVRIGHYROYHGFRPSHWHQFHIRU
example employment and health and safety laws, as well as any other powers necessary to 
secure a differentiated relationship with Europe. 
 
Although legally feasible, implementation of the plan set out in 6FRWODQG¶V3ODFHLQ(XURSH 
would require a high level of political will and legal creativity at both the UK and the EU 
level. There are exLVWLQJH[DPSOHVRIWKH(8¶VFRQVLGHUDEOHIOH[LELOLW\ZKHUHLWKDV
accommodated differential territorial application of EU law within a Member State or 
associated territories. However, the Prime Minister has not so far shown any signs of 
willingness to permit Scotland to negotiate a differentiated position as part of the Brexit 
negotiations. 
 
 
Act 2  
 
Enter ± The UK Government 
 
7KH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHDFWLRQWRLWVFRXQWHUSDUW¶VFDOOVIURP+RO\URRGWRUHVSHFWWKH
decision of Scottish voters to remain in the EU has been muted. Aptly summarised under the 
WLWOHRIWKHµ0D\'RFWULQH¶WKH8.*RYHUQPHQWLVsaid to be proceeding on the basis of two 
assumptions: first, that a certain course of action, namely Brexit ± however vaguely defined 
in its specifics ± is irresistible. Second, that the UK executive alone has direct responsibility 
for the implementation, delineation and definition of Brexit (Blick, 2016). This assumption 
H[SODLQVWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWLWDORQHhas the executive power through the royal 
SUHURJDWLYHWRVHUYHDQRWLFHLQWLPDWLQJWKH8.¶Vdecision to leave the EU under Article 50 of 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (see Act 3).  
 7KHµ0D\'RFWULQH¶LVFOHDUO\HQXQFLDWHGLQ7KHUHVD0D\¶VBrexit speech, given on 17 
January 2017, in which the Prime Minister set out her plans for a post-Brexit µ*OREDO%ULWDLQ¶
and made it clear that there would be no DFFRPPRGDWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶VGHVLUHIRUD
differentiated relationship with the EU. Doubts were also cast in this speech over the future 
remit of the Scottish Parliament. It is often assumed that those powers currently exercised by 
the EU which fall within devolved competence will be repatriated to the Scottish legislature 
and that the removal of the requirement in the Scotland Act that the Scottish Parliament 
cannot legislate contrary to EU law will mean a major enhancement of devolved powers. In 
her speech, Theresa May instead suggested instead that it would be left to the UK Parliament 
(with no mention of the devolved administrations) to decide on any future changes to the law. 
The UK GRYHUQPHQW¶VUHFHQWO\SXEOLVKHG%UH[LW:KLWH3DSHU± 7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V exit 
from and new partnership with the European Union - also suggests that complete onward 
devolution to the devolved legislatures and governments of EU competences is not a 
foregone conclusion.  
 
The official intergovernmental forum to enable the involvement of the devolved 
administrations in the Brexit process is the Joint Ministerial Committee (EU Negotiations) 
(JMC(EN)), a newly created format of the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). The JMC has 
never been a particularly successful forum for the exchange of views between the UK and the 
devolved administrations. The balance of power within the Committee is heavily tilted in 
favour of the UK Government with a UK Minister always in the chair and with the agenda 
largely set by UK Ministers. It is hard to see how such a structure could deliver a genuinely 
inclusive debate that shapes and informs the Brexit roadmap for the UK, taking account of 
the differing interests and voting patterns of the devolved nations. Indeed, according to the 
Scottish Government it has not. Speaking in the Scottish Parliament on 7 February 2017, 
Mike Russell, the Scottish Minister responsible for Brexit negotiations, stated that the 
JMC(EN) had not been involved in drawing XSWKHµKDUG%UH[LW¶ plan announced by the 
Prime Minister in her µ*OREDO%ULWDLQ¶VSHHFK. He also stated that the devolved 
administrations were not party to UK Government thinking. The last minute issuing of 
agendas to (at least) the devolved administrations ahead of JMC(EN) meetings and non-
discussion of items pertaining to the devolution of power scheduled on the agenda have also 
EHHQUHSRUWHG,QWKLVFRQWH[WDFRPPLWPHQWLQWKH%UH[LW:KLWH3DSHUWRIXUWKHUµELODWHUDO
GLVFXVVLRQV¶EHWZHHQWKH8.*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKHGHYROYHGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVµWRIXOO\
XQGHUVWDQGWKHLUSULRULWLHVZKLFKZLOOLQIRUPWKHFRQWLQXLQJGLVFXVVLRQV¶PLJKWDSSHDU
somewhat disingenuous.  
'HVSLWHPXFKUKHWRULFWRWKHFRQWUDU\WKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQRQ%UH[LWH[SRXQGHGWR
date appears to diminish rather than value the devolved constitutional landscape of the UK 
and the voices of the administrations within that. There is no legal means by which those 
voices can be taken into account and an already flawed intergovernmental talking shop is not 
providing a meaningful forum for genuine discussions based on mutual trust and respect. 
With the stakes so high, this is a sorry situation indeed, and in all likelihood, a constitutional 
collision course in the making. 
  
Act 3 
 
Enter ± The Supreme Court 
 
The Supreme Court has taken the place of the third actor in this constitutional drama. In R (on 
the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5 the Court was asked whether the UK Government had the power to 
JLYHIRUPDOQRWLFHRIWKH8.¶VZLWKGUDZDOIURPWKH(8WRµWULJJHUDUWLFOH7(8¶ZLWKRXW
prior parliamentary authorisation through a legislative Act. The outcome of the case in 
respect of this question is well known. However, the Court was also asked to examine the 
role of the Sewel Convention, now given statutory form by Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act. 
This provision provides that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate with regard to 
devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. Given that the decision to 
leave the EU directly impinges on a considerable part of the work of the Scottish Parliament 
and Scottish government on issues ranging from agriculture and fisheries, environmental 
protection to higher education and research, the argument was led that the UK Parliament 
required the consent of the Scottish Parliament before it could trigger Article 50 TEU. 
The Supreme Court analysed the wording of the provision to unanimously hold that it 
effectively restates a constitutional convention. It does not translate it into a legally binding 
obligation and thus does not legally enhance the constitutional position of the devolved 
institutions. The Court then reiterated the well understood constitutional maxim that it is not 
in the remit of the courts to police constitutional conventions since these are political 
agreements and not law. The Court then did not reach a conclusive decision on whether 
consent was required as a matter of convention but did decide that the devolved legislatures 
lack the legal power to block the triggering of Article 50 TEU. 
Two observations are offered on this. First, the decision of the Supreme Court highlights once 
again how fragile the devolved settlement is and powerless the devolved institutions are in 
the face of something so intrinsically significant to it/them; Brexit. Second, while the Scottish 
Parliament will not therefore have any involvement in the triggering of Article 50 TEU, it is 
likely that it will at a later stage of the unfolding Brexit process. For instance the Great 
Repeal Bill ± ZKLFKZLOOEHLQWURGXFHGLQWKHQH[W4XHHQ¶VVSHHFKLQRUGHUWRSUHVHUYH(8
laws in force in the UK post-Brexit ± will be subject to approval by the Scottish Parliament 
through a legislative consent motion. In other words the Sewel Convention will apply in that 
context. Given the different voting patterns and political and constitutional dynamics in 
Scotland (and Northern Ireland), this may be far more controversial and may certainly 
contribute to the heightening of tensions within our current constitutional drama. 
  
Act 4 
 
Enter ± The UK Parliament 
 
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ0LOOHUKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVVLPSO\SXWWLQJµWKH%UH[LWEDOO
ILUPO\EDFNLQWKH>8.@SDUOLDPHQW¶VFRXUW¶(Elliott, 2017). Only it, through the adoption of a 
statute ± and not the UK Government - can allow Article 50 TEU to be triggered. This raised 
hopes in some quarters that the two Houses of Parliament would vote down the draft 
legislation - EU Withdrawal Bill - or at least vote to insert substantive amendments to it, such 
as to secure PDUOLDPHQWDµPHDQLQJIXOYRWH¶RQWKH%UH[LWGHDOHDUO\LQWKHSURFHVVHIIHFWLYHO\
giving MPs and peers the chance to send the Government back to seek a better deal. 
UnwilliQJWRµfrustrate the will of the people¶, and in a significant nod to popular, as opposed 
to the traditional and embedded notion of representative democracy, the House of Commons 
voted with a majority of more than 300 to give the Prime Minister the power to trigger 
Article 50 TEU. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all SNP MPs voted against the Bill. More surprising 
is that the Bill also got through the House unamended. All eyes are now on the House of 
Lords, with many defiant speeches anticipated (at the time of writing) but ultimately with 
DSSURYDOH[SHFWHGSHUKDSVZLWKVHYHUDODPHQGPHQWVRQµPHDQLQJIXO¶SDUOLDPHQWDU\
approval of the Brexit deal and guaranteeing the rights of non-UK EU citizens living in the 
UK at the start of the Brexit negotiations.). 
  
Meanwhile, suggestions have been made that the Great Repeal Bill  - which legislates for 
what will happen on the day that the UK leaves the EU - will delegate statutory powers to 
enable Ministers to make changes, by secondary legislation, to give effect to the outcome of 
WKHQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKH(8³DVWKH\SURFHHG´ These so-FDOOHGµ+HQU\9,,,FODXVHV¶FDXVH
concern as they would allow the Government to circumvent the full legislative process, which 
the executive would otherwise need to use in order to enact primary legislation. The role of 
the devolved administrations in the scrutiny of such legislation is also not clear. On 7 
November 2016, dXULQJDGHEDWHLQWKH+RXVHRI&RPPRQVRQH[LWLQJWKH(8DQGZRUNHUV¶
rights, Mark Durkan MP (SDLP, Foyle) raised questions, which have yet to be resolved, 
concerning both Henry VIII powers and devolution:  
The right hon. Gentleman refers to the great repeal Bill, which is in essence the great 
download and save Bill for day one of Brexit. Who controls the delete key thereafter 
as far as these rights and key standards are concerned? Is it, as he implies, this House? 
Would any removal of rights have to be done by primary legislation, or could it be 
done by ministerial direction? And where is the position of the devolved 
Administrations in this? These matters are devolved competencies; will they be 
devolved on day one? 
 
Final Curtain? 
 
%UH[LWKDVHIIHFWHGDVKRFNRQWKH8.¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ, the consequences of which are 
penetrating deep and wide ± including questions about the extent of the royal prerogative and 
the very hierarchy of law, ultimately answered by the highest court in the land. Another 
central tenet of the UK constitutional landscape - the devolution settlement - is similarly 
being tested by Brexit, but appears to lack the legal teeth and the political mechanisms to 
effectively assert its place (and in the case of Scotland and Northern Ireland, the will of their 
electorate) within WKH8.¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODQGVFDSH. Brexit will effect fundamental changes 
to the devolution settlement and given that devolution has embedded itself increasingly into 
the fabric of the UK constitution over its almost 20 year history, it seems unconscionable that 
it might be at breaking point ± but on the basis of performances given thus far in the drama, it 
is, at least when viewed from North of the Border.  
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